Reasons for and reasons against by Snedegar, Justin
Reasons for and reasons against
Justin Snedegar1
 The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract What an agent ought to do is determined by competition between reasons
bearing on the options open to her. The popular metaphor of balancing or weighing
reasons on a scale to represent this competition encourages a focus on competition
between reasons for competing options. But what an agent ought to do also depends
on the reasons against those options. The balancing metaphor does not provide an
obvious way to represent reasons against. Partly as a result of this, there is a serious
lack of work on reasons against. A simple view is that there is no problem here,
since reasons against an option are really just more reasons for—in particular,
reasons for certain alternatives. This simple view lets us maintain the balancing
metaphor, and more importantly, it simplifies theorizing about the competition
between reasons. This is because if it’s true, there is really just one kind of com-
petition, the competition between reasons for competing options. This paper chal-
lenges the simple view, arguing against several ways of identifying which
alternatives to an option the reasons against it are reasons for. I also sketch a
competing view, according to which reasons against are distinct from reasons for—
these are two different normative relations. If this kind of view is correct, then our
theory of the competition between reasons will need to recognize at least two kinds
of competition: the one between reasons for competing options, and the one
between the reasons for an option and the reasons against it.
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1 Reasons and balancing
Deciding what you should do very often involves considering various trade offs.
Different options have different costs and benefits. Ross (1930) explained this idea,
at least in the moral case, in terms of prima facie duties. It is much more common
these days to talk about pro tanto reasons bearing on the options. What you should
do, according to this approach to normative theorizing, is determined by the reasons
bearing on the options open to you. In particular, it’s determined by competition
between these reasons. This competition between reasons is how we understand the
trade offs that are ubiquitous in thinking about what to do.
Though the idea that what you ought to do is determined by competition between
reasons is widespread, there has been very little work on actually developing the
details.1 The most common approach is to appeal to a metaphor of balancing or
weighing.2 We imagine a scale with pans corresponding to the options. The reasons
for those options are represented by weighted marbles that are placed on the pan
corresponding to the relevant option. The option you ought to choose is the one
corresponding to the lowest pan—since it has the most weight in it—once all the
reasons are taken into account.
This metaphor highlights at least three very important features of the competition
between reasons. First, just as the marbles can be of different weights, some reasons
are weightier or more important than others. Second, we see that reasons for one
option compete with reasons for other options, since as one pan goes down, the
others go up. Third, multiple reasons for a single option can combine to support the
option more strongly than either does individually, and so can combine to outweigh
a relatively weighty reason for a competing option, just as multiple lighter marbles
in one pan can outweigh a single heavier marble in another.
But everyone knows that this is just a metaphor, and that it is incomplete in
several ways. For example, it suggests that the strengths or weights of multiple
reasons for a given option will combine in a strictly additive way, like the weights of
marbles. This is most likely false. It also suggests that the weights of all reasons can
be compared; but many people believe in incomparability or incommensurability of
certain reasons. These issues are widely recognized, and do not tend to lead
philosophers writing about reasons astray. The thought is that when we are able to
compare some reasons, they compete in much the same way as marbles on a scale:
the reasons provide support for the relevant options, and some will provide more
support, and thus win the competition.
In this paper I will focus on a different way in which this picture is incomplete,
and which I believe may lead us astray in our theorizing about reasons. Following
Scanlon (1998) and many others, we know that a reason for an option is a
consideration that counts in favor of that option. The reasons for an option are very
naturally represented by marbles that go on the pan corresponding to that option.
1 See the papers in Lord and Maguire (2016) for some recent work on the topic.
2 See Horty (2012) for an important exception. Horty develops a theory of reasons, including the way in
which they support conclusions about what you ought to do, within a default logic framework.
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But what you ought to do depends on more than the reasons for the options open to
you. It also depends on the reasons against those options. The problem is that there
is no equally natural way to represent reasons against an option, within the
balancing metaphor. I believe this observation, plus a commitment to something like
the balancing metaphor (while recognizing its limitations, of course), explains why
there has been so little work on reasons against, as opposed to reasons for, despite
the recent explosion of work on reasons. So the first point I want to make is the
simple one that it is important to account for reasons against in our theorizing about
reasons, and that relying too heavily on the balancing metaphor makes it easy to
overlook them.
The view I focus on in this paper is one that is endorsed by some of the small
number of philosophers who have thought about reasons against, and more
importantly is a very natural one to come to, if you start with the balancing
metaphor and then try to accommodate reasons against. This is the simple view that
reasons against are really just more reasons for. In particular, this view holds that
reasons against an option A just are reasons for certain alternatives to A. Reasons
against A count against A by counting in favor of alternatives to A. The central
attraction of this view—put in terms of the metaphor—is that it lets us
straightforwardly represent reasons against: we already know how to think about
reasons for, as weighted marbles that go on the relevant pans.
I have raised the main issue for this paper, and will often talk, in terms of the
balancing metaphor, because doing so makes the discussion intuitive and easy to
follow. But it is important to emphasize that my primary interest here is in giving an
adequate (partial) theory of the metaphysics of reasons, not in criticizing the
balancing metaphor or finding a replacement. That said, what we ultimately want is
a theory of the competition between reasons, which the balancing metaphor is meant
to represent. The significance of this paper for the larger project is clear: if I am
correct that reasons against are distinct from reasons for, then this theory will need
to include an account of how reasons against factor into the competition between
reasons. The few authors who have started working out theories about the
competition between reasons have not shown how to accommodate reasons against,
as distinct from reasons for.3
So in less metaphorical terms, the central attraction of the simple view is that it
simplifies our theory of reasons in two ways. First, we can get by with only one
reason relation—the reason for relation. Second, we only need to make sense of one
kind of competition between reasons—the competition between reasons for
conflicting options. If we reject this simple view, on the other hand, we will need
an account of the reason against relation in addition to the reason for relation. We
will also need to understand at least two different kinds of competition between
reasons: (i) the competition between reasons for competing options (e.g., the wine is
complex but the beer is refreshing), and (ii) the competition between the reasons for
and reasons against a particular option (e.g., the burger is tasty but it is also
unhealthy). To come to a judgment about what we ought to do, all things
3 See, for example, Horty (2012).
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considered, we will presumably also need some way of aggregating the results of
these two kinds of competition. This is because the reasons against our options are
as important as the reasons for them. The simple view that reasons against one
option are just reasons for alternatives is much simpler.
In describing this simple view, I have been deliberately vague in saying that
reasons against A are reasons for ‘‘alternatives to A’’. To get a theory we can
evaluate, we need to spell out this idea in more detail. In the next section, I will
consider four different implementations and argue against each of them. These
different implementations say which alternatives to A the reasons against A are
reasons for. In Sect. 3, I will consider a way of rehabilitating two of these
implementations by appealing to reasons transmission—when reasons for one
option transmit to other, related options. I’ll argue that this is unsuccessful. Finally,
in Sect. 4, I will sketch a competing view according to which reasons against are
distinct from reasons for. On this view, there are (at least) two distinct normative
reason relations: the reason for relation and the reason against relation. I’ll show that
it can explain the initial appeal of some implementations of the simple view without
inheriting their problems.
2 Reasons against as reasons for
The simple view says that reasons against are really just more reasons for; in
particular, reasons against A are reasons for alternatives to A. In this section, I argue
against four ways of spelling out this idea by specifying which alternatives the
reasons against A are reasons for. These are: (i) reasons against A as reasons for
some alternative to A, (ii) reasons against A as reasons for :A, (iii) reasons against
A as reasons for the disjunction of alternatives to A, and (iv) reasons against A as
reasons for each alternative to A.
An important point to keep in mind is that the versions of the simple view I
consider here say that reasons against just are certain kinds of reasons for. This is a
stronger claim than one which says merely that reasons against an option are also
reasons for certain alternatives. This latter claim is consistent with the rejection of
the simple view, since it is consistent with a view (like the one I will defend) on
which the reason against relation is distinct from and not reducible to the reason for
relation.
2.1 Implementation 1: reasons for an alternative
The first implementation is that a reason against A is just a reason for some
alternative to A. So the set of reasons against A consists of the union of the sets of
the reasons for B, reasons for C, reasons for D, and so on. If we begin with the
balancing metaphor, this is a natural first thought. Recall that reasons for an option
support it by adding weight to its pan, and thus lowering the pan. An option wins
this competition if it corresponds to the lowest pan, once all the reasons have been
taken into consideration. A crucial part of the metaphorical balance (and of real
balances) is that as one pan goes down, the others go up. If winning the competition
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requires corresponding to the lowest pan, then things that make a pan go up make it
harder for the corresponding option to win the competition, and thus count against
it. So it is natural, at least given the balancing metaphor, to think of reasons against
A—considerations that count against A—as reasons for an alternative to A.
Moreover, and relatedly, this implementation is closely related to the common-
sense idea of an opportunity cost. Among the reasons against an option are the good
things you’ll miss out on by failing to do the incompatible alternatives. For
example, the high salary that comes with being a lawyer is a reason to be a lawyer. It
is also intuitively a reason against being a philosopher, instead, since if you’re a
philosopher (and not a lawyer) you’ll miss out on the high salary that comes with
being a lawyer.4
Nevertheless, this implementation is unsatisfactory as an account of reasons
against. As Greenspan (2005) emphasizes in a slightly different context in her
defense of the sort of view I defend in this paper, when we consider paradigmatic
reasons against options—the long hours that come with being a lawyer, the long
wait times at a particular restaurant, the high prices of the coffee at that shop—they
seem to target the options they are reasons against. Reasons against A highlight
some bad (in some sense) feature of A. But reasons for an alternative to A do not
necessarily target A in this way. This is easiest to see if we think in terms of the
balancing metaphor (which, recall, the defender of the simple view aims to
maintain). Suppose the choice is between A, B, C, and D. Now consider a reason for
one of the options, say B. That is represented in the metaphor by a counter in the
B pan. As we saw above, this does count against A in a sense, since by pushing the
B pan downwards, it raises the A pan. But note that it also raises the C and D pans.
So the reason for B does not seem to target A anymore than it targets C or D.
To move away from the metaphor, consider one of the paradigmatic reasons
against mentioned above: Northpoint has very long wait times, and that’s a reason
against going there. There may be several other options, including BeThai and the
One Under. If this reason against going to Northpoint is just a reason for one of the
alternatives, say, for BeThai, then it seems to count against the One Under just as
much as it counts against Northpoint. But the fact that Northpoint has very long wait
times doesn’t seem to count against the One Under. So we lose the sense in which at
least some reasons against an option seem to target that option. Thus, I do not think
this implementation is ultimately a very attractive one.
2.2 Implementation 2: reasons for the negation
The second implementation holds that a reason against A just is a reason for not
doing A, or for :A. This may be even more natural than the first implementation. In
4 In Sect. 4, I argue that the view I suggest actually does a better job accounting for the idea of an
opportunity cost. At this point, it is worth emphasizing the point I made above, that Implementation 1 is
stronger than the claim that reasons for one option are also reasons against incompatible alternatives.
First, it says that reasons for incompatible alternatives are all of the reasons against, and second it says
that in fact reasons against just are reasons for alternatives.
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fact, of the few philosophers who have suggested accounts of reasons against, this is
the most popular view.5
The primary advantage of this implementation over the first is that we can easily
explain the sense in which reasons against A target A. What the reason counts in
favor of, on this view, is not doing A. So in the restaurant case from above, the fact
that Northpoint has very long wait times is, on this view, a reason for not going to
Northpoint. This seems to much more clearly target the option of going to
Northpoint than a reason for going to, say, the One Under. In particular, unlike a
reason for going to the One Under, the reason for not going to Northpoint appears to
treat going to Northpoint and going to BeThai asymmetrically.
Nevertheless, I don’t think this implementation is, so far, satisfactory. This is
because many of our choices are more fine-grained than simply a choice between
doing an option A and not doing it, or doing :A. Often we have to choose between
A, B, C, D, and so on. The problem is that we do not yet know how a reason for
:A bears on these more fine-grained choices between A and several incompatible
alternatives. But reasons against A are clearly relevant to such choices: they count
against doing A. According to the simple view, for these considerations to be
reasons against A just is for them to be reasons for alternatives to A. That is, for the
considerations to count against A just is for them to support alternatives to A. The
problem for Implementation 2 is that in fine-grained choices, like that between A, B,
C, and D, the action for which these considerations are supposed to be reasons for—
:A—is not actually one of the alternatives. So Implementation 2 lacks an account of
how reasons against A bear on these more fine-grained choices.6
Though this second implementation nicely captures the sense in which reasons
against A target A, it does not yet explain how reasons against A are relevant for
more fine-grained choices between A and several incompatible alternatives. In
Sect. 3 I will consider a way to respond to this problem, but first I will consider two
other potential implementations of the simple view.
2.3 Implementation 3: reasons for the disjunction of alternatives
Another natural implementation of the simple view is that reasons against A are just
reasons for the disjunction of the alternatives to A. Like Implementation 2—that
reasons against A are reasons for :A—and unlike Implementation 1—that reasons
against A are reasons for some particular alternative to A—this implementation
explains the way in which reasons against A seems to target A. It does this because
A is treated asymmetrically from all the other options: it is the only option not
included in the disjunction for which the consideration is a reason.
But like Implementation 2, this view faces the important question of how reasons
against A bear on relatively fine-grained choices, like the choice between A, B, C,
and D. Implementation 2 treats reasons against A as reasons for :A. But since
5 See in particular Nagel (1970, p. 47) and Schroeder (2007, Chapter 7).
6 To be clear, the complaint is not that these reasons against A do not help us choose between the
alternatives to A. Rather, the complaint is that it is not clear how they bear on the fine-grained choices that
include A itself.
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:A isn’t an option (the choice is more fine-grained than that), we need some way of
understanding how this reason against A bears on this choice. The implementation
under consideration now faces this same question. Reasons against A are supposed
to be identified with reasons for the disjunction, B_C _D. But just as :A isn’t an
option, neither is B_C _D. So a reason for this disjunction does not appear to bear
on the choice between A, B, C, and D. In Sect. 3, I will consider such an account,
but argue that it fails.
2.4 Implementation 4: reasons for each of the alternatives
The final implementation of the simple view I want to consider is that reasons
against an option are reasons for each of the alternatives. Implementation 1 holds
that reasons against an option are reasons for any alternative and Implementations 2
and 3 hold that reasons against an option are reasons for a particular alternative—
the negation of that option, or the disjunction of alternatives, respectively. The first
does not explain how reasons against an option target that option. The second and
third do not explain how reasons against an option bear on relatively fine-grained
choices between that option and several alternatives to it.
This final implementation avoids both of those problems. Reasons against
A target A because it is the only option that these reasons are not reasons for. In
terms of the balancing metaphor, such reasons go on every pan except the A pan.
This also lets us see how these reasons bear on choices between A and a number of
alternatives. They support each of the individual alternatives, and not just their
disjunction.
Nevertheless, this implementation faces another serious problem. To appreciate
it, I need to briefly say something general about how I am thinking about reasons for
action. On the picture I prefer—and which many others accept, as well—reasons are
provided or explained by what I call objectives. What the objectives are will depend
on which more substantive theory of reasons is correct. On Humean, individual
desire-based views, objectives are the desires (or objects of the desires) of the
relevant agent. On ‘democratic’ Humean views like that in Manne (2016), the
objectives are desires of either the agent herself or of others. On value-based views,
objectives are values like justice, honesty, friendship, happiness, or even a sui
generis property of goodness. When a given action stands in a specific relationship
to one of these objectives, that objective provides or explains reasons bearing on the
action. On desire-based views, as well as some value-based views, this relationship
is usually taken to be promotion. Actions that promote the objects of your desires
are the actions for which you have reasons. On some value-based views, this
relationship may be something like respect or honor.7 When some action would
appropriately respect or honor a given value, that value provides or explains reasons
for the action. Most often, views which fit this broad pattern appeal to explanation in
giving their constitutive accounts of when some particular consideration is a reason
bearing on a given action. One straightforward version of this picture says that when
7 See Anderson (1993) and Scanlon (1998).
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some consideration r explains why performing action A would promote/respect
objective O, then r is a reason for A, explained by O.8
On this picture, reasons for and against actions are explained by objectives. If we
accept it, then it’s natural to think that just as reasons for A are explained by
objectives with respect to which A does well, in terms of promotion or respect,
reasons against A are explained by objectives with respect to which A does poorly.
The relevance for evaluating Implementation 4 of the simple view, that reasons
against A are reasons for each of the alternatives to A, is that it seems that we can
have reasons against A, explained by an objective, even if some other option does
even worse with respect to this objective. In such cases, it is not at all plausible that
the reason against A is a reason for this other, inferior (as far as the objective in
question goes) option. But Implementation 4 holds that a reason against A is a
reason for all of the alternatives.
Here is another version of the restaurant case from above, to illustrate. Suppose I
am trying to decide where to go for lunch, and am deciding between three
restaurants: Northpoint, the One Under, and BeThai. Northpoint is very crowded at
this time of day. That’s a reason against going to Northpoint. According to
Implementation 4, this reason against is really just a reason for each of the
alternatives. That is, it is a reason for going to the One Under and a reason for going
to BeThai. But suppose that, while BeThai is not crowded at all, the One Under is
even more crowded than Northpoint. In this case, it is not plausible that the fact that
Northpoint is so crowded is a reason for going to the One Under. Nevertheless, the
One Under being even more crowded does not seem to prevent the crowdedness of
Northpoint from being a reason against going there, especially given that there is a
non-crowded option, namely BeThai. So we should reject Implementation 4.
We may question whether this is really a problem for Implementation 4.9 That
Northpoint is crowded is a reason against going to Northpoint, and that the One
Under is even more crowded is a reason against going to the One Under. Very
plausibly, the reason against going to the One Under is stronger than the reason
against going to Northpoint. According to Implementation 4, then, though the fact
that Northpoint is crowded is a reason for going to the One Under, the fact that the
One Under is even more crowded is an even stronger reason for going to Northpoint.
Thus, we will not get the result, on Implementation 4, that we ought to go to the One
Under, assuming that crowdedness is all that matters.10 The defender of
Implementation 4 must reject the claim that the fact that Northpoint is crowded is
a reason against going to Northpoint but not a reason for going to the One Under.
But she can explain why considerations of crowdedness nevertheless favor
Northpoint over the One Under.
If all we wanted out of a theory of reasons was a way to generate the correct
rankings of options, then Implementation 4 might be adequate. But though this is an
8 For theories that accept this kind of picture, see Schroeder (2007), Finlay (2014), Snedegar (2014),
Wedgwood (2009), and Maguire (2016).
9 Thanks to a referee for raising this objection.
10 If we assume other things, like ambiance, matter, then it might be that the One Under wins out. But of
course that is just as it should be.
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important task for a theory of reasons, I think we want more than this. In particular,
our theory of reasons should explain the claims we are willing to accept about
reasons. One such claim, I take it, is just the claim I appealed to in the argument,
that if the One Under is more crowded than Northpoint, then the fact that Northpoint
is crowded cannot be a reason for going to the One Under.11 Relatedly, we
ordinarily think of reasons for an option as things that tend to make that option more
rational or choiceworthy than it would otherwise be.12 But the fact that Northpoint is
crowded is not the kind of thing that can make going to the One Under, which is
even more crowded, more rational than it would otherwise be. These may not be
decisive points, since most philosophical theories will have to reject some ordinary
claims we want to make. But I find these claims sufficiently compelling that I count
it as a serious mark against Implementation 4 that it must reject the them. As we’ll
see, the view I suggest can capture them easily.
2.5 Summing up
To sum up this section, I have argued against four natural interpretations of the
simple view that reasons against are really just certain kinds of reasons for. Though
this view, in one or another of these implementations, would simplify our theory and
allow us to maintain the attractive balancing metaphor for the competition between
reasons, it appears that actually spelling out the simple idea is a serious challenge.
By seeing the problems that face each of the implementations, we can draw out
three criteria for a successful theory of reasons against. First, we saw from the
failure of Implementation 1 that at least paradigmatic cases of reasons against an
option need to somehow target that option: they should bear on that option
differently than they bear on the alternatives.
Second, we saw from the challenge facing Implementations 2 and 3 that reasons
against an option need to bear on relatively fine-grained choices between that option
and a number of alternatives. It is not enough to simply hold that reasons against
A are reasons for :A, or for the disjunction of alternatives to A, if those relatively
coarse-grained actions are not options in the choice. Since reasons against an option
are relevant for these fine-grained choices, any theory of reasons against must say
how they are relevant.
Finally, we saw from the failure of Implementation 4 that reasons against
A cannot be reasons for each alternative, since some of those alternatives may do
even worse with respect to the objective that explains why the consideration is a
11 We could try to offer a pragmatic defense of Implementation 4, along the lines developed in Schroeder
(2007, pp. 92–97), by pointing out that though the fact that Northpoint is crowded is a reason for going to
the One Under, it is significantly outweighed, and so irrelevant for deliberation. But the familiar ways of
canceling the false implicature that explains the unacceptability of the claim—that the reason is
weighty—do not seem to me to make the claim sound better; thus I doubt that this strategy will work.
12 Perhaps not invariably, since some reasons for an option seem to combine with other reasons for that
option in a way that makes the option less rational. See, for example, Horty (2012, p. 61), who gives an
example involving two symptoms, each of which individually suggests a disease for which Drug A is
appropriate, but when taken together suggest a disease for which Drug A is deadly. Nothing like this
seems to be involved in the case in question here.
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reason against A. So if reasons against one option are reasons for alternatives—even
if they are not simply identified with reasons for alternatives, as the simple view
holds—they cannot be reasons for every alternative.
At the end of the paper, I will sketch a theory of reasons for and against that
satisfies these three criteria by abandoning the simple view, and treating reasons
against as distinct from reasons for. First, though, in the next section I will consider
one way to answer the challenge facing Implementations 2 and 3, of saying how
reasons against an option bear on relatively fine-grained choices.
3 Reasons transmission
The challenge facing Implementations 2 and 3 is to say how reasons against A bear
on relatively fine-grained choices between A and some number of alternatives, like a
choice between A, B, C, and D. Many of our choices are like this; just think of
choosing between universities, restaurants, vacation destinations, or even just plans
for how to organize your day. In choosing between Northpoint, BeThai, and the One
Under, the fact that Northpoint is crowded is a reason against going to Northpoint.
According to Implementation 2, this is just a reason for not going to Northpoint. But
this doesn’t yet tell me how to factor this reason into the choice I face. According to
Implementation 3, the fact that Northpoint is crowded is a reason for either going to
BeThai or going to the One Under. But again, I don’t know yet how to factor this
into the choice I face. On the simple view, the fact that Northpoint is crowded is
supposed to factor in by supporting alternatives to going to Northpoint, but the
alternatives identified by Implementations 2 and 3 are not among the options in
these more fine-grained choice situations.
A plausible thought here is that the reason against going to Northpoint bears on
these other options derivatively. That is, they are reasons for those other options, if
they are, because they are reasons against going to Northpoint. Recently, there has
been lots of work on the ways in which reasons for one option transmit to become
derivative reasons for other, related options. That is, there has been lots of work
formulating transmission principles for reasons. So the suggestion I’ll explore in
this section is that reasons against A bear on relatively fine-grained choices between,
say, A, B, C, and D derivatively, via a transmission principle, because they are non-
derivative reasons for either :A (on Implementation 2) or B_C _D (on Imple-
mentation 3).
If we’re sticking with the simple view, that reasons against are really just a
certain kind of reason for, then it seems that reasons against A must bear on these
fine-grained choices by supporting alternatives to A. Notice that the individual
alternatives to A are ways of not doing A, or ways of performing the disjunctive
action. A simple and at least initially attractive example of a general transmission
principle for reasons for that tells us how reasons transmit from actions to ways of
carrying out those actions is the following:
Facilitative Principle (FP): if r is a non-derivative reason for A, and doing
B facilitates doing A, then r is a reason for B.
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By calling the reason for A ‘non-derivative’, I just mean that it is a reason for A, and
not because it is a reason for anything else. Derivative reasons, on the other hand,
are reasons for an option only because they are reasons for something else. By
saying that doing B ‘facilitates’ doing A, I mean something quite broad. It is meant
to include taking the means to doing A, so that starting your car facilitates going to
the store. But it also is also meant to include relations of constitution: driving to the
store isn’t naturally described as a means to going to the store; rather, it constitutes
going to the store. This kind of constitution is what is most directly relevant for
thinking about how reasons for :A or reasons for B_C _D could bear on choices
between A, B, C, and D, since performing one of these individual alternatives
constitutes performing either :A or the disjunction of alternatives.
This principle explains many plausible cases of transmission. For example, the
fact that it’s your birthday is a reason for me to bake you a cake, given the birthday-
related conventions of our society. We can suppose that this is a non-derivative
reason. Suppose I am deciding what to bake for you, and my choices are baking you
a chocolate cake or baking you chocolate cookies. The fact that it’s your birthday is
a reason for me to bake you a chocolate cake. This seems to be because this fact is a
reason to bake you a cake, and baking you a chocolate cake constitutes baking you a
cake. More generally, the FP allows us to explain how reasons for relatively coarse-
grained options support more fine-grained ways of carrying them out, over options
that are incompatible with the coarse-grained option.13
If we supplement either Implementation 2 or Implementation 3 with the FP, then
we can see how reasons against A bear on more fine-grained choices. According to
these implementations, the reasons against A are really just reasons for relatively
coarse-grained alternatives to A—either :A or a disjunction of alternatives. Since
performing the individual alternatives facilitates performing these coarse-grained
alternatives, by constituting the performance of them, the FP gives us reasons for the
individual alternatives. This is how reasons against A bear on these more fine-
grained choices.
But, as may already be clear, neither the defender of Implementation 2 nor the
defender of Implementation 3 should accept this principle. Combining the principle
with either of these implementations gives us the result that non-derivative reasons
against A are reasons for each alternative to A, in the more fine-grained choices.
This is because each of these alternatives is both a way of not doing A and a way of
doing the disjunction of alternatives. So by adding the FP in order to explain how
reasons against A could bear on more fine-grained choices, both Implementation 2
and Implementation 3 collapse into something very close to Implementation 4, and
face the same problem. The problem, again, is that some alternatives to A may be
worse than A with respect to the objective that explains the reason against A. In
these cases, it is not plausible that the reason against A is a reason for these inferior
(with respect to the relevant objective) alternatives.14
13 See Raz (2005), Schroeder (2005), and Bedke (2009) for discussion of principles like this one.
14 See Bedke (2009, p. 681), footnote 15. There, Bedke rejects Implementation 2, that reasons against
A are reasons for :A, in connection with his version of the facilitative principle.
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I have only considered one fairly simple transmission principle, and it will most
likely need refining to be acceptable, even leaving aside considerations about
reasons against and the simple view. Thus, the defender of one of these
implementations may try to give more sophisticated transmission principles in
order to get around this problem. But since reasons against, on these views, are
meant to really just be certain kinds of reasons for, any proposed principle will have
to be plausible for reasons for more generally. In particular, the amended principles
will still need to explain the kinds of intuitive cases of reasons transmission that
motivate such principles in the first place. The argument of this section suggests that
formulating a principle that does this while also giving acceptable results when
applied to reasons against (as the simple view understands them) may be difficult. I
leave that as a task for the defender of the simple view. I do not have a general
argument that this can’t be done. Instead, I will now move on to develop an
alternative view, on which reasons against are distinct from reasons for.
4 Reasons against as distinct from reasons for
In this section I will sketch a theory of reasons for and reasons against that treats
them as distinct. After doing so I will show that this meets the three criteria for a
theory of reasons against I listed at the end of Sect. 2, and that it can explain the
appeal of the various implementations of the simple view. Finally, I will briefly
compare the view suggested here to Greenspan’s (2005) view, which also
distinguishes between reasons for and reasons against.
The starting point is the idea, mentioned in Sect. 2, that reasons are provided or
explained by the promotion or respect of objectives—usually desires or values.
Often views that accept this picture are put in terms of binary notions of promotion
or respect. If an option promotes or respects an objective, there are reasons for it; if
not, there are not. But I think we do better to put things in comparative terms—in
terms of how well a given action promotes or respects the objective, compared to
the alternatives.
Here is the argument for this claim, in brief.15 Theories that accept a binary
promotion or respect condition on reasons struggle to explain cases in which some
consideration is a reason for A when the alternative is B, though not a reason for
A when the alternative is a different option, C. For example, that I’m trying to get in
shape is a reason to cycle to work when the alternative is driving, but not a reason to
cycle to work when the alternative is jogging, assuming that jogging is better
exercise than cycling. In fact, if the alternative is jogging, then the fact that I’m
trying to get in shape is plausibly a reason against cycling to work, since jogging is
better exercise. If we accept a binary promotion condition, then for the fact that I’m
trying to get in shape to be a reason to cycle to work, when the alternative is driving,
cycling to work must promote or respect the relevant objective (for example, my
getting in shape). But if it does, then it seems that this consideration would also be a
15 I argue for this claim at length in other work Snedegar (2014), (2017), Chapter 4.
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reason to cycle to work when the alternative is jogging—after all, cycling promotes
or respects (in binary terms) my getting in shape. On the other hand, if we accept a
comparative condition, such that an action has to promote or respect an objective
better than the alternatives, we can explain cases like this. Since cycling promotes or
respects the relevant objective better than driving, I have a reason to cycle when the
alternative is driving. But since it does not promote or respect the relevant objective
better than jogging, I do not have a reason to cycle when the alternative is jogging.
So here are the analyses of reasons for and reasons against that I propose:
For: r is a reason for A when r explains (or is part of the explanation) why
A promotes/respects some objective better than all of the alternatives.
Against: r is a reason against A when r explains (or is part of the
explanation)16 why A promotes/respects some objective less well than some
alternative.
Recall that the objectives referred to here will depend on the correct substantive
theory of reasons. They may be desires, objective values, or something else. There
are also important questions about what it takes for one alternative to better promote
or respect an objective than another that I cannot address here. For example, a
natural idea is that one action better promotes an objective than another if the first
makes the instantiation of the objective more probable than the second. But I do not
want to assume such a probability-raising view here.17
There are variants of this kind of view which make different choices about how
many of the alternatives an option has to do better or worse than, with respect to a
given objective, for some consideration to be a reason for or against it. My view
puts a strong condition on reasons for and a weak condition on reasons against. For
some objective to provide a reason for an option, that option has to do the best with
respect to the objective. For some objective to provide a reason against an option,
that option only has to do worse than some alternative. We could instead hold that
there are reasons for an option when it does at least as well as any other option, or
when it does better than at least one alternative. Similarly, we could hold that there
are reasons against an option only when it does worse than every other alternative. I
think that the analyses I give do a nice job of achieving a balance between capturing
intuitive claims about reasons and making theoretically attractive predictions,
though I cannot defend that claim here.18 I will illustrate some of the attractive
features of this view below, when I show how it satisfies the three criteria on a
successful theory of reasons against that we saw in Sect. 2. I will also address what I
take to be the most serious objection to this view at the end of Sect. 4.2. This is the
objection that, given For, we do not get reasons for options that do better than all of
the other options, but are on a par with one another.
16 From now on, I will drop this qualification.
17 Schroeder (2007) and Finlay (2014) accept a probability-raising view of promotion. Other recent work
on this issue includes Behrends and DiPaolo (2011), Snedegar (2014), Coates (2014), Sharadin (2015),
and Lin (2016).
18 See Snedegar (2014), (2017), Chapter 4, for much more discussion.
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The most important feature of this view for the purposes of this paper is that it
allows for reasons against an option that are not reasons for any other alternative.
Consider the following variant on a case from above. I am trying to decide where to
go for lunch, and the options are Northpoint, the One Under, and BeThai. Once
again, Northpoint is very crowded at lunchtime, and BeThai is not at all crowded.
But now—unlike in the case above—the One Under isn’t crowded, either. In this
case, the fact that Northpoint is very crowded is a reason against going there,
explained by (for example) my desire to avoid a long wait, since Northpoint does
worse than at least one of the other alternatives (and in fact, worse than both) with
respect to this objective. Since neither the One Under nor BeThai are crowded, they
do equally well with respect to this objective, and so by For, this objective will not
provide reasons for either one. We only get a reason against going to Northpoint.
4.1 Criteria for reasons against
The three criteria on a successful theory of reasons against from Sect. 1 were the
following. First, reasons against an option need to target the option they are reasons
against, by bearing on it differently than they bear on other alternatives. Second,
reasons against an option need to bear on relatively fine-grained choices between
that option and a number of alternatives. Third, reasons against an option are not
reasons for alternatives that do worse with respect to the objective that explains the
reason against. I will now show that the view I’ve sketched here satisfies these
criteria.
First, if r is a reason against A, it explains why A does relatively poorly with
respect to some objective. In particular, it explains why some other alternative does
better than A. Consider another variant of the restaurant case. Northpoint is very
crowded, the One Under is also very crowded, though not quite as crowded as
Northpoint, and BeThai is not at all crowded. The fact that Northpoint is very
crowded is a reason against going there, since this fact explains why going to
Northpoint would do worse than at least one other alternative (and in fact, worse
than both) with respect to the objective of avoiding long waits. But note that this
fact—that Northpoint is very crowded—does not explain why going to the One
Under would do worse than some alternative with respect to this objective. This fact
doesn’t really have anything to do with the One Under. So the reason against going
to Northpoint—that Northpoint is very crowded—does seem to target that option.
But things are actually not quite so straightforward. Notice that even if some
alternative B does better with respect to a given objective than A, it does not follow
that that objective does not provide reasons against B. It may be that another
alternative, C, does even better than B. It will then follow from Against that the
objective provides reasons against B. In the case above, the objective of avoiding a
long wait will not only provide reasons against going to Northpoint, but also reasons
against going to the One Under. So though the reason itself—that Northpoint is very
crowded—targets going to Northpoint, there is a sense in which the objective that
provides that reason doesn’t really target Northpoint, since it also provides reasons
against going to the One Under. But I believe this is actually the correct result. The
objective of avoiding a long wait does seem to provide reasons against going to the
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One Under, given that there would be a long wait there, and would not be a long
wait at BeThai. But we still do get a kind of asymmetry, even at the level of
objectives, since for an objective to provide reasons against an alternative, by
Against, there must be some alternative that it does not provide reasons against.
Second, it is clear that reasons against can bear on relatively fine-grained choices.
The analysis of reasons against makes reference to the alternatives, so no matter
how coarse- or fine-grained they are, we can apply the analysis to see what the
reasons for and against each of the options are. This holds both for relatively coarse-
grained choices, like a choice between A and :A or a choice between A and
B_C _D, and more fine-grained choices like a choice between A, B, C, and D.
Finally, reasons against one option, explained by some objective, are not reasons
for alternatives that do worse with respect to that objective. Suppose r is a reason
against A, explained by objective O. This means that there is some other alternative
that does better than A with respect to O, and that r is part of the explanation for this.
Now suppose that another alternative, B, does even worse than A with respect to
O. Then obviously B does not do the best with respect to O, and so, by For, there
will not be reasons for it, provided by O. In particular, the reason against A, r, will
not be a reason for B.19
So the view I’ve suggested here, on which reasons for and reasons against are
distinct, meets the three criteria (or, at least, three of the criteria) for a successful
account of reasons against. Now I want to show how this view explains some of the
appeal of the various implementations of the simple view.
4.2 Explaining the appeal of the simple view
Part of the appeal of Implementation 1—that reasons against A are just reasons for
an alternative to A—comes from the idea of an opportunity cost: that among the
costs of an option are the good features of incompatible alternatives that you’ll miss
out on. The view I’m defending here captures this idea, but in a way that allows for
a distinct category of reasons against. It follows from For and Against that anytime
there’s a reason for an option, explained by some objective, there will also be
reasons against the alternatives, explained by that objective. From For, if r is a
reason against A, explained by O, then A does the best with respect to O, and r helps
explain this. This means that the other alternatives do worse than A, and so by
Against, O will provide reasons against these other alternatives. And it is plausible
that r will help explain this, as well.20 But unlike on Implementation 1, we may have
other reasons against an option, in addition to those that are also reasons for the
19 This is actually too hasty. The consideration, r, which is a reason against A, explained by O, may be a
reason for B, but in that case it would have to be explained by some other objective. So strictly speaking,
all that follows is that if r is a reason against A, explained by O, and B does worse than A with respect to
O, then r is not a reason for B which is explained by O. But this is the correct result. I believe this is an
instance in which—at least if we accept a picture on which reasons are explained by objectives—we need
to be careful to pay attention to the objectives in our theorizing about reasons.
20 To fully evaluate this claim, we would need a theory of explanation. For now it may be enough, to
capture the idea of an opportunity cost, to note that the objective will provide reasons against the
alternatives to A whenever it provides reasons for A.
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alternatives. In particular, if the alternatives to an option A all do better than A, but
are on a par with one another, with respect to an objective, then that objective will
provide reasons against A but not reasons for any of the other alternatives.
Implementation 2 holds that reasons against A are simply reasons for :A. There
is certainly something attractive about this picture, but as we’ve seen, it is
problematic to simply identify reasons against A with reasons for :A. We need to
know how these reasons for :A can bear on more fine-grained choices, and spelling
this out is not straightforward. The view I have suggested here can explain the
appeal of this implementation. On this view, reasons against A will also be reasons
for :A in the coarse-grained choice between A and :A. It is easy to see that this
follows from For and Against. But as noted above, we also have an account of how
these reasons bear on more fine-grained choices, since For and Against can be
applied regardless of the granularity of the set of alternatives.
Similar remarks apply to Implementation 3, which held that reasons against A are
reasons for the disjunction of alternatives. In the coarse-grained choice between
A and B_C _D, any reason against A will be a reason for the disjunction. But again,
we have an account of how these reasons bear on more fine-grained choices.
This observation helps to (at least partially) diffuse one objection to the view I’ve
suggested here, based on the strong condition on reasons for.21 If two options do
equally well with respect to some objective, and better than all of the other
alternatives, For tells us that that objective will not provide reasons for either of
them. It may seem more plausible to hold that it provides reasons for each of them. I
think we can mitigate this counterintuitive consequence. Suppose that A and B do
equally well with respect to an objective, and both do better than C. Then in the
choice between A, B, and C, the objective will not provide reasons for either A or
B. But first, note that it will provide reasons against C, but not reasons against either
A or B. Second, note that in the related, more coarse-grained choice between
A_B and C, the objective will provide reasons for the disjunction. Finally, the
objective will provide reasons for A in a choice only between A and C, and
similarly, it will provide reasons for B in a choice only between B and C. This may
not completely satisfy the objector, but given the other attractions of this view,
illustrated above, I hope that it does significantly reduce the force of the objection.
4.3 Comparison with Greenspan’s view
Before concluding, I will contrast my view with the one defended by Greenspan
(2005). She defends a view like mine, according to which reasons against (which
she calls ‘‘negative reasons’’) are distinct from reasons for. In fact, there is a sense in
which reasons against are more important for Greenspan. This is because only
reasons against can ground a rational (or moral) requirement—reasons for are
always optional, in the sense that they can be rationally ignored, even in the absence
of reasons for alternatives. On the other hand, if there is a reason against an option
but no (or even insufficiently strong) reasons for it, then it is irrational to perform
21 Snedegar (2014), (2017), Chapter 4.
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the action. This is part of Greenspan’s criticism-based picture of rationality,
according to which rationality is primarily about avoiding or answering criticism,
rather than about doing what your reasons most strongly support, as a more
traditional view holds. This line of thought forms the basis of Greenspan’s argument
for a reasons for/reasons against distinction. In brief, she argues that by holding that
only reasons against can ground requirements, we can capture two attractive but
seemingly inconsistent thoughts: (i) requirements are based on reasons, and (ii)
reasons do not rationally compel. The first is true of reasons against, while the
second is true of reasons for.22
Unlike Greenspan’s view, my view and arguments are compatible with the more
traditional picture. So though I have framed my discussion as a criticism of the
balancing metaphor, Greenspan’s view is a more radical departure. Part of what the
balancing metaphor is meant to capture is that reasons compete in a way that makes
talking in terms of their weight at least approximately correct, which is compatible
with my view. But on Greenspan’s view, this is just not what reasons do. Instead,
reasons against ground criticisms while reasons for answer those criticisms.
Relatedly, though both Greenspan and I distinguish reasons against from reasons
for, they differ more radically on Greenspan’s view. Grounding a criticism and
answering a criticism are quite different things. On the other hand, on my view, both
reasons for and reasons against are explanations of facts about how well an option
promotes or respects an objective, in comparison with the alternatives. It is thus
easier to see, on my view, why the simple view that reasons against are really just
reasons for is so tempting. This is only circumstantial evidence in favor of my view,
but it does highlight the difference between it and Greenspan’s view.
5 Conclusion
Theorizing about reasons tends to focus almost exclusively on reasons for, but
reasons against options are also important. Relying too heavily on the balancing
metaphor makes it easy to overlook reasons against. Here, I have argued against
various ways of spelling out the simple and natural idea that reasons against just are
a certain kind of reasons for. I also sketched a view on which reasons against are
distinct from reasons for, and showed that it provides a more satisfactory account of
reasons against.
Though a theory like mine does complicate our theory of reasons by adding a
separate reason against relation, the particular version I have offered analyzes the
reason for and reason against relations using the same kinds of explanatory
resources—primarily, (i) promotion and respect of objectives and (ii) explanation.
So the added complexity should not be too worrying in this respect.
The most important consequence of this view is that we may need to complicate
our account of the competition between reasons. Reasons for competing options
compete with one another, and for this competition, the balancing metaphor is apt.
22 Compare Gert (2004).
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But reasons for one option also compete with reasons against that option. If the
arguments of this paper are correct, we cannot straightforwardly subsume this kind
of competition to the competition between reasons for competing alternatives. This
means that the balancing metaphor is not even approximately correct. Unfortu-
nately, I do not have a replacement picture. But whatever replacement we offer
should allow for a distinct role for reasons against. Perhaps it isn’t surprising that
the simplistic balancing metaphor is inadequate for fully representing the complex
interactions among reasons. Given that there are few detailed accounts even of the
competition between reasons for conflicting options, I take it that there is a much
larger project of working out how it is that reasons compete to determine what we
ought to do. What I am suggesting is that this project should include a distinct
account of the competition between the reasons for an option and the reasons against
it.
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